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ABSTRACT
Most restaurant firms, by their operational nature, own and operate a large amount of corporate real 
estate (CRE), even though real estate is not their primary business activity. This is not only common 
across restaurant firms of different sizes but also linked to their sales and profitability. Borrowing the 
arguments of resource- based theory and using financial data for the years between 1999 and 2014, 
this study investigated the relationship between CRE holdings and restaurant firm performance in 
the United States. Briefly, our findings demonstrate that the CRE ratio and the rent ratio, in particular, 
have different impacts on restaurant firms’ financial performance and market- driven risk structures 
when different forward lags are considered.
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Introduction
Firms across all industries own and use several dif-
ferent types of tangible and intangible assets to gen-
erate revenues and increase their size. In addition 
to generating revenues, these strategic assets can 
also increase shareholders’ wealth and firm value. 
However, when executives analyze operational and 
financial performance, some balance sheet items, 
such as corporate real estate (CRE) holdings, are not 
considered essential to generate sales and earnings. 
Executives also believe that investing in CRE hold-
ings might impede firm performance due to agency 
problems and capital spent (i.e., bondholders might 
be worse off due to increased financial risk). This is 
mainly because most companies have little choice 
but to build or purchase properties, which execu-
tives label as “non- revenue- generating assets.” How-
ever, the reality is that holding large amounts of CRE 
as a strategic asset is essential and that CRE has an 
immense effect on firms’ operational and financial 
performance. There are multifold reasons real estate 
holdings are critical. First and foremost, some com-
panies need to place their products and run their 
operations in physical locations where lease alter-
natives are lacking. Further, CRE holdings have a 
tremendous influence on tax issues, credit quality, 
and firm value, since they can serve as collateral 
for securing loans for new financial projects and/or 
new asset investments. In addition, CRE assets are 
recorded at historical costs, and the value of these 
holdings may not be reflected in stock prices. Thus 
CRE holdings can positively affect firms’ financial 
performance and market risk structures (Park & 
Glascock, 2010). Lastly, CRE assets are operational 
resources that naturally and strategically lead to 
financial and operational competitive advantages 
because they cannot be easily imitated by compet-
itors. The corporate strategy of holding and invest-
ing in CRE as a strategic asset might enable firms to 
outperform their competition (Amit & Schoemaker, 
1993; Jensen, 1986).
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Generally speaking, reducing CRE holdings cre-
ates shareholder value and enhances financial per-
formance; yet in some industries, the exact opposite 
is true. For example, CRE holdings are strategic 
production factors and are critical for the growth, 
investment, and performance of firms operating in 
service- oriented and capital- intensive industries. 
Restaurant firms, in particular, have a unique his-
tory of carrying high volumes of CRE- based capital 
expenditures. Restaurant properties must be con-
stantly acquired or constructed for these compa-
nies to generate cash flows from operating activities 
(Dalbor & Upneja, 2004). However, if not optimized 
with careful financial and operational analyses, CRE 
holdings and investments expose firms to enormous 
levels of real estate risk (Lee & Jang, 2012). Strate-
gically investing in plant, property, and equipment 
(PP&E) assets and intelligently maintaining fixed 
asset balances on the books is a solid long- sighted 
financial advantage for restaurant companies aim-
ing to improve their earning potential, unlock 
shareholder value, and maximize firm performance 
(Kizildag, 2015; Kizildag & Ozdemir, 2016; Lee & 
Jang, 2012). In this scope, the empirical focus on the 
role of CRE as a strategic asset in restaurant firms’ 
financial performance is surprising, given that the 
existing literature focuses primarily on the deter-
minants of capital expenditures and the common 
factors influencing firm performance and risk struc-
ture (Borde, 1998; Dalbor & Jiang, 2013; Gu & Kim, 
2002; Hsu & Jang, 2008; Moon & Sharma, 2014). In 
other words, there is not enough evidence to clearly 
observe how resources like CRE affect firms’ finan-
cial performance and market- driven risk structure. 
We believe that we can address this gap by defining 
and evaluating the role of CRE holdings in restau-
rant firms’ operational and financial performance 
and risk structure. In this way, we aim to comple-
ment the existing literature by providing a better 
practical understanding.
Literature Review
CRE is a core business asset, and it represents a sig-
nificant proportion of a company’s balance sheet. 
Mahoney and Pandian (1992) described two main 
reasons a firm might own resources to generate 
rents (i.e., generate returns that are greater than the 
opportunity costs). First, rents may be generated by 
owning a scarce valuable resource. Second, entre-
preneurial rent may be achieved through risk taking 
based on unique capabilities. Location is an import-
ant factor in a restaurant’s success (Tzeng, Teng, 
Chen, & Opricovic, 2002); therefore, to be success-
ful, a restaurant firm must own or lease property 
in desirable locations (Ling, Naranjo, & Ryngaert, 
2012). It has been argued that the stock market 
is often unaware of CRE holdings and that stock 
prices may not adequately reflect the current mar-
ket value of CRE (Park & Glascock, 2010). In ratio 
analysis, underestimating the value of CRE could 
greatly impact critical ratios, such as the return on 
assets and the market- to- book value ratio, which in 
turn may lead to undervaluation. In terms of risk 
premium, Tuzel (2010) argued that firms with high 
shares of real estate tend to be perceived as riskier, 
meaning that investors demand higher premiums 
for holding shares of such firms. Studies investi-
gating the relationship between firm performance 
and CRE holdings have indicated that it is a mixed 
relationship. For instance, Liow (2004) found that 
firms with high CRE holdings in Singapore had 
lower returns and higher risk. Brounen and Eichlotz 
(2005) reported a negative relationship between 
CRE ownership and firm performance. On the other 
hand, a more recent study by Tuzel (2010) showed 
that firms with higher shares of real estate had higher 
returns than firms with lower shares of real estate. 
These studies examined firms from various indus-
tries, which might explain the conflicting results. 
For some industries, such as retail (Park & Glas-
cock, 2010), CRE investment is more closely linked 
to business strategy than it is in other industries.
Growth through investments in fixed assets is 
not the only way to achieve increased market share, 
especially in the hospitality industry. Most restau-
rant and hotel companies expand through franchise 
and management agreements, in which they own 
no assets but provide the know- how and the brand 
name, which allows them to collect fees from asset 
owners. A recent study investigated whether this 
asset- light and fee- oriented strategy created value in 
the hotel industry and reported that hotel firms with 
lower levels of fixed assets were traded at a premium 
(Sohn, Tang, & Jang, 2013). The results of this study 
indicated that investors may perceive fixed assets not 
as strategic resources but rather as unnecessary risks 
that magnify operational risks. Lee and Jang (2012) 
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estimated hospitality firms’ exposure to real estate 
risk using a regression equation with firms’ daily 
return as the dependent variable and the real estate 
risk, calculated as the beta for the return on the Dow 
Jones REIT (real estate investment trusts) Index, 
as the independent variable. The results indicated 
that hospitality firms were exposed to real estate 
risk at some time during the 2005– 2009 period if 
they owned or leased properties for their opera-
tions. However, the Dow Jones REIT Index includes 
REITs that own a variety of real estate, ranging from 
residential buildings to storage facilities. Measur-
ing real estate risk based on this index implies that 
these assets bear essentially the same risk as opera-
tional assets (i.e., CRE) owned by hospitality firms. 
Therefore, there exists a need to study the specific 
influence of operational assets, such as CRE, on firm 
performance in the hospitality industry.
Firm Performance, Risk, and Strategic Resources
There are several different measures of firm financial 
performance. Growth and profitability are two of the 
most important goals in business (Brush, Bromiley, 
& Hendrickx, 2000; Jang, 2011), and profitability is 
the most commonly used basis for defining success. 
From an investor’s view, profitability is usually mea-
sured as the ratio of net income over a performance 
metric, such as outstanding shares to estimate earn-
ings per share (EPS), equity to estimated return on 
equity (ROE), or assets to estimate return on assets 
(ROA). When examining the managements’ effi-
ciency in using CRE, ROA is the most frequently 
used performance measure (Daniel, Lohrke, For-
naciari, & Turner, 2004). Profitability measures 
are accounting measures of firm performance that 
provide an internal view of a firm’s past success. 
Markets, on the other hand, value a firm’s future 
earnings, incorporating current and future risks that 
might impact future cash flows. One such measure 
is called systematic risk, or beta, which is estimated 
using the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), with 
higher values indicating riskier firms in relation to 
the market (Jensen, 1969). Jensen’s index, or alpha 
(α), is another market- based measure of perfor-
mance that provides a comparison of a given firm’s 
market performance to the performance of firms 
experiencing similar market risk (Jensen, 1968). This 
measure is expressed as the estimate of the intercept 
in the CAPM regression equation of risk- free firm 
returns and market returns. A positive alpha sug-
gests higher returns compared to the market, and a 
negative alpha indicates lower performance.
In the real estate literature, several studies have 
investigated the performance effects of CRE on firm 
risk or financial performance. However, evidence of 
this relationship has been either mixed or inconclu-
sive (Park & Glascock, 2010). Deng and Gyourko 
(2000) observed that high levels of property owner-
ship were associated with higher betas, higher risk, 
and poor stock performance. On the other hand, 
Seiler, Chatrath, and Webb (2001) found no sig-
nificant relationship between CRE and systematic 
risk. Studies investigating CRE in hospitality tend 
to examine the determinants and factors impacting 
fixed- asset investment. The results of these studies 
indicate that growth opportunities and liquidity are 
positive factors that facilitate fixed- asset investment 
(Dalbor & Jiang, 2013; Moon & Sharma, 2014). 
However, the performance impact of these CRE 
investments has not been investigated. Accord-
ing to resource- based theory, strategic resources, 
assets, and capabilities that are valuable, relatively 
scarce,  and difficult to imitate have the ability 
to deliver a competitive advantage beyond their 
contributions to the production process (Amit & 
Schoemaker, 1993). Assets specific to a given loca-
tion can be considered one such resource in the 
hospitality industry because location is a critical 
success factor for this industry (Tzeng et al., 2002). 
The strategic selection and ownership of a location 
should enable restaurant firms to achieve compet-
itive advantage. For example, McDonalds is well 
known for its successful CRE strategy, in which the 
firm purchases key store locations and then leases 
them to franchisees. By using this strategy, McDon-
alds generates revenues via leases as well as other 
benefits from the appreciation of the real estate. 
Franchising restaurant firms tend to rebalance their 
CRE by “cherry- picking” (i.e., buying back certain 
profitable stores from franchisees; Knott & McKel-
vey, 1999). In sum, we assume that restaurant firms 
are rational and contend that  the benefits of CRE 
should exceed its costs.
The purpose of this study was to examine the 
effects of CRE holdings on restaurant firms’ perfor-
mance. Resource- based theory argues that owning 
strategic assets can contribute to the success of a 
  THE JOURNAL OF HOSPITALITY FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 7
firm beyond their contribution to the production 
process. Therefore, we developed the following 
hypothesis:
H1: The level of CRE holdings positively affects 
restaurant firms’ financial performance.
Methodology
Sample and Data Selection
We utilized multiple sources for our regression anal-
yses. Our sample comprises restaurant firms with 
at least 3 years of daily stock returns and matching 
financial and accounting data during the examina-
tion period from 1999 to 2014. After screening and 
eliminating all irrelevant or otherwise unaccept-
able data, a total of 149 publicly traded restaurant 
firms under standard industry code (SIC) 5810 and 
5812 were identified and selected for our analyses. 
Daily stock returns were obtained from the Center 
for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. 
Data for firm- specific variables were obtained from 
CRSP/COMPUSTAT merged files. The final sample 
included a total of 149 firms and 1,063 firm- year 
observations.
Variables and Estimation Procedures
The key independent variable in this study was 
CRE. There is no direct measure of CRE holdings; 
therefore, we followed the vast majority of the lit-
erature and used net PP&E for the restaurant firms. 
As Park and Glascock (2010) suggested, we proxied 
firms’ CRE holdings, which are reported under the 
PP&E lines in the CRPS/COMPUSTAT database. In 
this vein, we calculated a corporate real estate ratio 
(CRER) as net PP&E divided by total assets. We 
used net PP&E instead of gross values because net 
values are reported on the balance sheet and used in 
calculations of various ratios, such as asset turnover, 
that markets use to evaluate companies (Brounen & 
Eichholtz, 2005; Deng & Gyourko, 2000; Seiler et al., 
2001). Moreover, it is widely known that firms might 
prefer to lease, rather than own, their assets (Lee, 
Huh, & Lee, 2015; Singh, 2013). Capitalized lease 
obligations are included in PP&E; however, operat-
ing leases are not. Therefore, we included a rent ratio 
(RENT), measured as rent expense divided by total 
assets, to reflect the leasing (rather than owning) 
of assets (Lee et al., 2015).
The study’s dependent variable was firms’ finan-
cial performance and risk. We measured firm per-
formance using two measures. The first measure was 
ROA, since the extant literature indicates that this 
is the most common measure of CRE performance 
(Daniel et al., 2004). ROA was calculated as net 
income divided by total assets. The second measure 
of firm performance was Jensen’s index, or alpha 
(α). This is the intercept in the CAPM regression 
equation at which daily risk- free firm returns are 
regressed to daily risk- free market returns. As a risk 
measure, we extracted the systematic risk, or beta 
(β), portion of firms’ stocks in the CAPM model. We 
included three control variables with very close ties 
to firms’ financial performance levels and risk struc-
tures in the market: (1) financial leverage, (2) growth 
opportunities, and (3) firm size. Financial leverage 
(FINLEV) has been identified as one of the import-
ant factors impacting firms’ financial performance 
in markets, since it includes risky debt (Kizildag, 
2015; Lee, Koh, & Kang, 2011) and is measured as 
the ratio of total debt value to total equity value. 
Growth opportunity was measured using Tobin’s Q 
(Q). We employed Chung and Puritt’s (1994) for-
mula to estimate an approximation of Q, where Q 
equals the sum of the market value, liquidating value 
of outstanding preferred shares, and total debt net of 
current assets divided by total assets. As suggested 
by the related literature, we took the firm’s total asset 
value to identify firm size (SIZE). Furthermore, fol-
lowing previous literature, we took the natural log-
arithm of Q and SIZE to cope with the size of some 
restaurant firms (Park & Jang, 2013).
We ran three models including all variables dis-
cussed in the previous paragraph to examine the 
relationship between firm performance and CRE 
holdings to test our main hypothesis. The first model 
employed ROA as the dependent variable. Depen-
dent variables for the second and third models were 
computed using the CAPM, as suggested by Lintner 
(1965) and Sharpe (1964). The CAPM model is as 
follows,
 (Rit – Rft) = αit + βit(Rmt – Rft) (1)
where Rit is the stock return on day t for firm i; Rft 
is the risk- free rate of return, computed as the daily 
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return on a 12- month treasury bond for each month; 
Rmt is the stock return on day t for a market portfo-
lio; βit is the systematic risk for firm i for year t; and 
αit is the alpha value (α), which is the intercept for 
the excess return for each firm i for each year t.
Thus we can write our model as follows,
 FPit+τ = αi + β1CRERit + β2RENTit  
 + β3FINLEVit + β4Qit + β5SIZEit + uit (2)
where FPit is firm performance measured by ROA, 
αit, and βit with 1- , 2- , and 3- year forward lags 
(τ = 1, 2, 3). The time gap between performance 
measures and independent variables is to allow 
markets time to adjust to new information (Fama 
& French, 2006). CRER is the corporate real estate 
ratio (net PP&E divided by total assets), and RENT 
is the rent expense ratio (rent expense divided by 
total assets). The control variables included in the 
model are FINLEV, measured as total debt divided 
by total equity; Tobin’s Q, measured as the natural 
log of the market value of the common stock plus 
the preferred stock and total debt divided by total 
assets, representing growth opportunities (Dalbor & 
Jiang, 2013); and SIZE, measured as the natural log 
of total assets (Hsu & Jang, 2009).
We conducted some preliminary analysis to 
determine which regression analysis to use. Ulti-
mately, we used the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian 
multiplier (LM) test for each model to determine 
if a pooled regression was more appropriate for 
our analysis. Further, we used the Hausman test to 
determine if a random- effect or fixed- effect model 
was more appropriate for our data. We also tested 
for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity and took 
measures to remedy the issues.
Results
Descriptive statistics for the sample are presented 
in Table 2. Restaurant firms had an average ROA of 
1.36%, which ranged from −217.38% to 165.49% 
over the sampled period with a standard deviation 
of 18.10%. There was a huge gap between the mini-
mum and maximum ROAs, indicating the effects of 
economic recession and recovery during the sample 
period. Average firm excess return, α, was 0.0005 
(range: −0.011 to 0.013) with a standard deviation 
of 0.002. Average firm risk, β, was 0.678 with a stan-
dard deviation of 0.475 and ranged from −0.798 to 
2.321. The standard deviations for the performance 
measures suggest that restaurant firms experienced 
large fluctuations in profitability, stock returns, and 
systematic risk. CRER was approximately 62% with 
a standard deviation of 21%. CRER experienced a 
downward trend and declined over time from about 
65% in 1999 to about 46% in 2014, as depicted in 
Figure 1. RENT, on the other hand, fluctuated over 
the years around 8% to 10%, dropping to about 8% 
in 2014. The average and median number of stores 
continued to increase over time for our sample (see 
Figure 2).
Due to the independency of the measures utilized 
in the regression models, we did not obtain extreme 
Table 1. Variable Descriptions and Measures. This table 
reports detailed descriptions of the variables we used in our 
regression models. The derivations of each variable are also 
reported.
Variables Descriptions and Measures
CRERit Corporate real estate ratio, calculated as book value 
of Property, Plant, and Equipment/Total Assets.
RENTit Rent ratio, calculated as Rent Expense/Total Assets.
ROAit Return on Assets, calculated as Net Income/Total 
Assets.
αit Alpha, obtained from the CAPM regressions.
βit Beta, obtained from the CAPM regressions.
FINLEVit Financial leverage, calculated as Total Debt/Total 
Equity.
Qit Tobin’s Q, calculated as natural log of market value of 
common stock plus preferred stock and total debt 
divided by book value of total assets.
SIZEit Size, calculated as natural log of Total Assets.
Table 2. Selective Descriptive Statistics. This table reports 
detailed descriptions of the variables we used in our 
regression models. The derivations of each variable are also 
reported.
Variables N M SD Min Max
CRERit 1063 0.6231 0.2104 0 0.9676
RENTit 1063 0.0904 0.0753 0 0.6773
ROAit 1063 0.0136 0.1810 –2.1738 1.6549
αit 779 0.0005 0.0020 – 0.0112 0.0139
βit 779 0.6780 0.4758 –0.7985 2.3213
FINLEVit 1063 1.6503 2.1676 0.0265 9.1208
Qit 1063 0.2039 0.6671 –3.8294 2.9659
SIZEit 1063 5.3376 1.9362 –1.0556 10.5085
Note: CRERit = Corporate Real Estate Ratio, Net Property, Plant, 
and Equipment/Total Assets. RENTit = Rent Ratio, Rent Expense/ 
Total Assets. ROAit = Return on Assets, Net Income/Total Assets. αit 
= Alpha, intercept estimated using CAPM. βit = Beta, coefficient of 
market risk premium estimated using CAPM. FINLEVit = Financial 
Leverage, Total Debt/Total Equity. Qit = Natural log of Tobin’s q, 
measured as market value of common stock plus preferred stock 
and total debt divided by total assets. SIZEit = Natural log of Total 
Assets.
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Figure 1. Annual Average Corporate Real Estate Ratio (CRER) and Annual Average Rent Ratio (RENT) for Restaurant Firms 
between 1999 and 2014.
Figure 2. Annual Average and Median Count of Restaurant Firms.
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levels of correlation coefficients (see Table  3). 
Instead, the results suggested that the correlations 
were low to moderate (r<0.45). For instance, we 
observed the highest positive correlation coefficient 
between firm size and the systematic risk compo-
nent of firms’ stocks. This finding contradicts the 
notion that smaller firms are riskier compared to 
larger firms, and ours is not the first study to report 
such a relationship (i.e., Song, Park, & Lee, 2017, 
p. 113). It is possible that in the restaurant industry, 
larger firms might experience a higher stock price 
volatility compared to smaller firms. Furthermore, 
our findings also indicate that increasing firm size 
while also increasing levels of CRE might increase 
firms’ systematic risk.
We first tested if the pooled ordinary least squares 
(OLS) is more appropriate for the data analysis using 
the LM test. A significant LM test result (p<0.001) 
for all three models indicated that a panel data 
analysis was more appropriate. We further tested 
whether a random- effects or fixed- effects model is 
more appropriate for the data by running the Haus-
man test. A significant Hausman test (p<0.001) for 
all the models indicated that a fixed- effects model 
was more appropriate for the analysis. In addition, 
we used a modified Wald test to assess for hetero-
scedasticity and tested for autocorrelation. Results 
of both analyses were significant in all three models 
(p<0.001). In order to remedy the heteroscedastic-
ity, we report robust standard errors for all models.
Hypothesis Testing
We employed fixed- effects regression models in our 
panel data in order to control for the time- invariant, 
firm- specific variables. Three performance mea-
sures, ROA, alpha, and beta, were used as depen-
dent variables and were measured at 1, 2, and 3 years 
forward lag, resulting in a total of nine models. The 
results of the first three models, in which ROA was 
the dependent variable, are shown in Table 4. CRER 
is significant at the .05 level in the 1- year lead model. 
RENT, measured as rent expense divided by total 
assets, has a positive and significant impact on ROA 
in two- and 3- year lead models. One explanation 
for this relationship is that the increase in CRER 
Table 3. Correlation Results. This table demonstrates correlation analysis across the variables used in our regressions.
Variables ROA Alpha Beta CRER RENT FINLEV Q
Alpha 0.1438*
Beta 0.1697* –0.0893*
CRER –0.0170 –0.0301 0.0684
RENT –0.4124* 0.0383 –0.2386* –0.1703*
FINLEV –0.1612* –0.0249 0.0350 –0.0622 0.0942*
Q 0.4468* 0.1438* 0.3317* –0.0393 –0.1044* –0.0370
SIZE 0.4050* –0.1410* 0.4934* 0.1248* –0.4367* 0.0746* 0.4606*
Note: Coefficient estimates are statistically significant at 5 percent level (*p<0.05).
Table 4. Regression Results for ROA. This table shows coefficient estimations for ROA regressions with three forward lags  
(τ = 1, 2, 3). FPit+τ = αi + β1CRERit + β2RENTit + β3FINLEVit + β4Qit + β5SIZEit + uit
ROAit+1 ROAit+2 ROAit+3
B t B t B t
CRERit –0.1315 (–2.78)*** 0.0437 (0.63) 0.1160 (1.37)
RENTit 0.3044 (1.06) 0.7598 (1.81)* 0.6047 (2.28)**
FINLEVit 0.0029 (0.73) –0.0002 (–0.08) –0.0049 (–1.17)
Qit 0.0417 (2.04)** 0.0182 (1.39) 0.0293 (0.74)
SIZEit –0.0229 (–1.81)* –0.0164 (–1.65) 0.0143 (0.70)
N 940 818 707
#of Firms 136 120 109
R2 0.0773 0.0881 0.0510
Note: ROAit = Return on Assets, Net Income/Total Assets. CRERit = Corporate Real Estate Ratio, Net Property, Plant, and Equipment/Total 
Assets. RENTit = Rent Ratio, Rent Expense/ Total Assets. FINLEVit = Financial Leverage, Total Debt/Total Equity. Qit = Natural log of Tobin’s q, 
measured as market value of common stock plus preferred stock and total debt divided by total assets. SIZEit = Natural log of Total Assets. 
Coefficient estimates are statistically significant at * p< 0.1, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01.
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requires capital investment, usually long- term debt, 
and additional costs such as opening costs. These 
costs might have a negative impact on the profitabil-
ity of a firm in the short run. However, as the results 
indicated and as is suggested by the resource- based 
view theory, in the long- run, the strategic assets (i.e., 
real estate) can contribute to the success of a busi-
ness beyond their contribution to the production 
process (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993).
Table 5 shows the results of models using alpha 
as the dependent variable. CRER had a significant 
positive impact in all three models. Rent ratio had a 
significant positive impact on the 1- year lead model 
but not the other forward lags (2- and 3- year lags). 
This finding suggests that owning real estate has a 
positive impact on long- term market outperfor-
mance. However, renting only improves short- term 
market outperformance, and its effect fades away. 
One possible explanation for this pattern might be 
that owning the property might contribute to the 
firm’s performance beyond its operational use, as 
suggested by the resource- based view theory (Amit 
& Schoemaker, 1993; Barney, 1991). Renting, on the 
other hand, might be beneficial in the short run, as 
it does not increase debt and reduces the tax burden, 
and the firm is not impacted by the additional risk 
of owning a real estate (Lee & Jang, 2012). Increas-
ing rent costs and the possibility of losing a valuable 
asset (i.e., location) in the long run might be the 
contributing factors for renting having no impact 
on long- term outperformance.
The results of the models that used beta as the 
dependent variable are presented in Table 6. CRER 
and RENT had no significant impact on the beta 
model. Results from this model might suggest that 
the market accepts the real estate risk for these firms 
as part of their operations and that owning or rent-
ing real estate does not impact the stock volatility.
Table 5. Regression Results for Alpha. This table reports coefficient estimations for Alpha regressions with three forward 
lags (τ = 1, 2, 3). FPit+τ = αi + β1CRERit + β2RENTit + β3FINLEVit + β4Qit + β5SIZEit + uit
αit+1 αit+2 αit+3
B t B t B t
CRERit 0.0016 (1.72)* 0.0019 (2.01)** 0.0044 (3.54)***
RENTit 0.0071 (1.72)* 0.0022 (0.75) 0.0001 (0.04)
FINLEVit 0.0001 (1.12) 0.0001 (2.37)** 0.0001 (2.08)**
Qit –0.0018 (–7.59)*** –0.0014 (–5.37)*** –0.0002 (–0.69)
SIZEit –0.0012 (–5.93)*** –0.0008 (–4.77)*** –0.0001 (–0.73)
N 691 611 538
#of Firms 86 76 74
R2 0.2276 0.1220 0.0417
Note: αit = Alpha, intercept estimated using CAPM. CRERit = Corporate Real Estate Ratio, Net Property, Plant, and Equipment/Total Assets. 
RENTit = Rent Ratio, Rent Expense/ Total Assets. FINLEVit = Financial Leverage, Total Debt/Total Equity. Qit = Natural log of Tobin’s q, measured 
as market value of common stock plus preferred stock and total debt divided by total assets. SIZEit = Natural log of Total Assets. Coefficient 
estimates are statistically significant at * p< 0.1, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01.
Table 6. Regression Results for Beta. This table details coefficient estimations for beta regressions with three forward lags (τ 
= 1, 2, 3). FPit+τ = αi + β1CRERit + β2RENTit + β3FINLEVit + β4Qit + β5SIZEit + uit
βit+1 βit+2 βit+3
B t B t B t
CRERit –0.2685 (–1.23) –0.0929 (–0.40) –0.0262 (–0.10)
RENTit –0.4821 (–1.06) –0.9041 (–1.41) –0.3437 (–0.51)
FINLEVit 0.0353 (3.03)*** 0.0120 (0.71) 0.0112 (1.09)
Qit 0.0596 (1.23) 0.0740 (1.59) 0.1197 (2.55)**
SIZEit 0.1734 (4.69)*** 0.0904 (2.36)** 0.0464 (1.01)
N 691 611 538
#of Firms 86 76 74
R2 0.0817 0.0330 0.0249
Note: βit = Beta, coefficient of market risk premium estimated using CAPM. CRERit = Corporate Real Estate Ratio, Net Property, Plant, and 
Equipment/Total Assets. RENTit = Rent Ratio, Rent Expense/ Total Assets. FINLEVit = Financial Leverage, Total Debt/Total Equity. Qit = Natural 
log of Tobin’s q, measured as market value of common stock plus preferred stock and total debt divided by total assets. SIZEit = Natural log 
of Total Assets. Coefficient estimates are statistically significant at * p< 0.1, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01.
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Concluding Remarks and Discussion
The purpose of this study was to investigate the 
impact of CRE holdings on restaurant firms’ finan-
cial performance and to present a better understand-
ing of the risk these holdings create. Previous studies 
indicated that CRE has a positive impact on a firm’s 
financial performance (i.e., Park & Glascock, 2010), 
and some found a negative relationship between 
CRE and firm performance (i.e., Ling et al., 2012). 
The resource- based view (RBV) of the firm argues 
that firms generate rents through strategic resources 
that they own (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993). Our 
analysis indicates that CRE holdings have a positive 
impact on firm performance for an extended period 
of time in the restaurant industry. For instance, 
CRER has a positive impact on the alpha models. A 
positive impact on alpha indicates that CRE hold-
ings positively affect firm market outperformance. 
These findings support the arguments and conclu-
sions of Park and Glascock (2010), who suggested 
that CRE investments in the retail sector seem to be 
more closely related to business strategy than other 
sectors. Therefore, the results we obtained from our 
regressions partially support our proposed hypothe-
sis. Owning or renting CRE has a positive impact on 
profitability and market outperformance for restau-
rant firms. However, CRE has no significant impact 
on restaurant firms’ systematic risk.
Implications for Educators and Industry 
Professionals
The results of this study complement findings from 
previous research on firms’ CRE holdings and finan-
cial outcomes in the markets. From a corporate 
financial management standpoint, we obtained per-
suasive and pervasive outcomes that could add value 
to practice. By using multiple performance measures 
over an extended period (1999 to 2014), we were 
able to show that the importance of CRE holdings 
as strategic assets cannot be ignored by restaurant 
firms in terms of new financial projects. The core 
restaurant businesses are highly dependent on real 
estate investments and holdings that establish their 
corporate operations, revenues, earnings, and sales. 
Specifically, since CRE holdings are financially ben-
eficial for restaurant firms, restaurant companies can 
invest in a reasonable number of positive net present 
value (+NPV) CRE projects to achieve higher long- 
term financial performance. This financial strategic 
practice will help restaurant companies achieve sta-
ble growth, allocate costs and expenses (i.e., leasing 
expense, weighted average cost of capital [WACC]) 
optimally, and maintain economic prosperity for 
healthy relationships between agents and princi-
pals (Madanoglu, Kizildag, & Karadag, 2012). The 
reverse scenario can also be very critical for restau-
rant firms with respect to financial growth and sta-
bility in the long run. For instance, decreasing the 
volume of new investments in real estate holdings 
and real estate projects can be costlier to those firms, 
possibly causing volatile stock prices and decreas-
ing collateral value and credit ratings. This will in 
turn adversely affect restaurant firms’ stock prices 
and their shareholders’ wealth (Kizildag, Barber, & 
Goh, 2010). Therefore, restaurant firms must eval-
uate their real estate investment options and exist-
ing CRE holdings very carefully to sustain financial 
health for both existing shareholders and the new 
investors they might attract. As strategic assets, CRE 
investments and holdings are also critical and vital 
for restaurant firms to restructure the outstanding 
debt if needed and to hedge themselves against eco-
nomic downturns and recessions.
Limitations and Future Studies
Our study is not without limitations. First, it should 
be noted that our sample comprises only publicly 
traded restaurant firms; thus our results may not be 
applicable to private restaurant chains. In addition, 
our model may not be directly employed by a sin-
gle unit of a restaurant chain. Furthermore, interna-
tional chains in our sample may be exposed to other 
risk factors for which we do not control. While this 
study introduces a novel variable to explain firm 
risk, we do not employ some of the variables used in 
previous studies in hospitality research. Therefore, 
we recommend that a comparative study using the 
variables proposed in the studies of Borde (1998), 
Gu and Kim (2003), Hsu and Jang (2008), and Kim, 
Ryan, and Ceschini (2007) be conducted. Future 
researchers should also employ other theoretical 
perspectives, such as agency theory and institutional 
theory, to delve further into the effects of CRE on 
firms’ financial performance. Despite these minor 
limitations, we believe that the results and findings 
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of this study are still pervasive and persuasive and 
that they reflect valid inferences for the general pop-
ulation of U.S. restaurant firms.
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